The Secret Deal That Shaped Jordan's West Bank



 Three months before Israel declared independence, a single secret meeting in London redrew the map of the Middle East and prevented the establishment of a Palestinian state.

In February 1948, as the region braced for the end of the British Mandate and the implementation of the UN Partition Plan, Transjordan's Prime Minister, Tawfik Abu al-Huda, arrived in London. Accompanying him to his secret meeting with British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin was an unusual interpreter: British General John Bagot Glubb, known as Glubb Pasha, commander of the Arab Legion, the strongest and most professionally trained army in the Arab world, funded entirely by the British Treasury.

On the table was King Abdullah I's plan: as soon as the last British soldier left Palestine on May 15, the Arab Legion would cross the Jordan River, seize the territory designated for the proposed Arab state, namely Judea and Samaria, and annex it to his kingdom.

The British Foreign Secretary's response was revealed only decades later, when the archives were opened. Bevin gave the plan a clear green light, subject to one firm condition: "It seems the obvious thing to do, but do not go and invade the areas allocated to the Jews."

Britain's interests were clear. London feared that an independent Palestinian state would fall under the control of the Mufti, Haj Amin al-Husseini, a leader who had spearheaded the revolt against British rule in the 1930s and actively collaborated with Nazi Germany during World War II. By contrast, the Hashemite King Abdullah was viewed as a loyal and stable ally who could safeguard British imperial interests at the gateway to the emerging Cold War.

The shared fear of the Mufti had already created a surprising convergence of interests on the Zionist side. In November 1947, just days before the UN vote on November 29, Golda Meir met secretly with King Abdullah at the Naharayim power station. The two shared a common adversary, and the Zionist leadership strongly preferred a pragmatic neighbor with whom agreements could be reached over a hostile state led by al-Husseini.

When war broke out in May 1948, the situation on the ground became considerably more complicated.

Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia entered the conflict not only to fight the newly established State of Israel, but also as part of an internal Arab power struggle aimed at preventing Abdullah's territorial expansion. Pressure from the Arab League forced the Jordanian king to depart from his earlier understandings with Golda Meir. The Arab Legion fought bloody battles against the IDF for control of Jerusalem, which had been designated an international zone, as well as Latrun and Gush Etzion.

Nevertheless, Bevin's instruction was strictly observed: the Arab Legion never invaded the coastal plain or the territory allocated to the Jewish state.

The consequences of this diplomatic maneuver remained in place for 19 years. In 1950, Jordan formally annexed Judea and Samaria, with British recognition, while Egypt maintained control over the Gaza Strip under a strict military administration. Neither country established a Palestinian state.

To this day, historians debate whether this was a coordinated conspiracy to divide the land in advance or simply a cold and calculated convergence of interests.

Either way, the documents that eventually came to light demonstrate that the borders of the Middle East were shaped not only on battlefields, but also behind closed doors, far from public scrutiny.

Source:
Collusion Across the Jordan (1988).
https://www.amazon.co.uk/Collusion-Across-Jordan-Partition-Palestine/dp/0198278314

Comments